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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 2000 Session, the General Assembly enacted legislation
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or
repealed a number of sections of the Virginia Code. It also carried
over one significant bill to the 2001 Session. In addition, there
were nine Supreme Court of Virginia opinions, one United States
District Court opinion, two Virginia Circuit Court opinions, and
one Attorney General's opinion raising issues of interest to the
general practitioner as well as the specialist in wills, trusts, and
estates during the period covered by this review. This article re-
ports on all of these legislative and judicial developments.'
II. LEGISLATION
A. The Rule Against Perpetuities-Uniform Statutory Act
The 1982 Session of the General Assembly abandoned the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities in favor of the Restate-
ment's combination "wait and see" and "cy pres" model2 that it
amended to provide rules for both donative and nondonative
transfers.3 The 2000 Session, responding to a request from the
* Professor of Law, emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they will
often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated,
those section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 2000
supplement for the new sections.
2. Virginia enacted the Restatement rule prior to its official promulgation by the
American Law Institute. For the source used by Virginia, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROP. §§ 1.4-1.6 (Tentative Drai No. 2, 1979).
3. See Act of Apr. 7, 1982, ch. 249, 1982 Va. Acts 399 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-13.3 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). The source and operation of this new rule is discussed in J.
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Virginia Bar Association, largely abandoned the Restatement
rule and effective July 1, 2000, made Virginia the twenty-sixth
state to adopt the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
Act4 which, for the most part, applies only to interests arising out
of donative transfers.5 The Act was adopted intact, mutatis mu-
tandis, except for deletion of the provision authorizing limited
retroactivity.6 Generally speaking-which is a dangerous way to
speak of perpetuities matters-the Act validates nonvested inter-
ests that either (i) satisfy the common law rule applied at the
time the interest is created, or (ii) vest or terminate within ninety
years after the interest's creation.7 Nonvested interests that are
not validated do not automatically fail, but may instead be re-
formed by a circuit court "in the manner that most closely ap-
proximates the transferor's manifested plan of distribution and is
within [ninety years]. "' Although a more detailed explanation of
the Act is not feasible within the confines of this annual review, it
Rodney Johnson, The Transformation of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Virginia,
NEWSLETrER, (T.C. Williams Sch. of Law, Univ. of Richmond, Va.) Oct. 1982, at 10. Al-
though the General Assembly's attempt to make the Restatement rule retroactive was de-
clared unconstitutional seven years after its enactment, in Lake of the Woods Ass'n v.
McHugh, 238 Va. 1, 9, 380 S.E.2d 872, 876 (1989), the statute was not amended to reflect
this decision until the 2000 Session.
4. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES ACT 8B U.L.A. 321 (1993 & Supp.
2000). For a listing of the other 25 enacting jurisdictions, see id. at 61 (Supp. 2000). Copies
of the Act, which contain the Commissioners' official comments and are indispensable to
an understanding of the Act's operation, may be obtained from the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Suite 1300, Chicago, Il-
linois 60611.
5. Act of Apr. 8, 2000, ch. 714, 2000 Va. Acts 386 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-12.1 to -12.6 (Cum. Supp. 2000)). The Act, however, is made expressly applica-
ble to nonvested interests arising out of the following nondonative transfers:
(i) a premarital or postmarital agreement; (ii) a separation or divorce settle-
ment; (iii) a spouse's election; (iv) a similar arrangement arising out of a pro-
spective, existing, or previous marital relationship between the parties; (v) a
contract to make or not to revoke a will or trust; (vi) a contract to exercise or
not to exercise a power of appointment; (vii) a transfer in satisfaction of a
duty of support; or (viii) a reciprocal transfer.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-12.4(1) (Cure. Supp. 2000).
6. Notwithstanding the desirability of such a provision, it was believed to be unac-
ceptable to the Supreme Court of Virginia in the light of its decision in McHugh, 238 Va.
at 1, 380 S.E.2d at 872. Although Virginia adopted the language of the Act, it rejected the
Act's philosophy that the Rule Against Perpetuities should not apply to nondonative
transactions other than those listed in section 55-12.4(1) For the list of nondonative trans-
fers, see supra note 5. The Virginia legislation retains the "wait and see" Restatement
provision of section 55-13 as the rule governing all other nondonative transfers. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-13 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-12.1(A) (Cure. Supp. 2000).
8. Id. § 55-12.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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may be helpful to restate which version of the Rule Against Per-
petuities will apply to various transactions at different points in
time. For nondonative transfers, (i) the common law rule will
govern all nonvested interests created prior to July 1, 1982,9 and
(ii) the Restatement rule will govern those interests created any
time after June 30, 1982,10 except that (iii) those listed in section
55-12.4(1) that are created after June 30, 2000, will be governed
by the Uniform Act." For donative transfers, (i) the common law
rule will govern all nonvested interests created prior to July 1,
1982,12 (ii) the Restatement rule will govern those created after
June 30, 1982, buL bfore-July 1, 20uu,' ai? -(i)-thUfiT6-rm Act
willgovern those crMea -f Er-;Tun 0,2000.'4 However, both of
the preceding statements are subject to the perpetuities' "opt-out"'
legislation enacted by the 2000 Session. 5
B. The Rule Against Perpetuities-"Opt-Out" Provision
Regretfully, the 2000 Session enacted a pei-petuities "opt-out"
provision 6 at the request of the Virginia Bankers Association,
thereby placing Virginia in the line of lemmings leaping into a
"perpetuities unknown" in order to obtain a perceived tax bene-
fit' for a favored few 8 more than ninety years in the future9 un-
9. McHugh, 238 Va. at 4-5, 380 S.E.2d at 873.
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(B)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
11. Id. §§ 55-13.3(A), 55-12.5 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
12. McHugh, 238 Va. at 4-5, 380 S.E.2d at 873.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(B)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
14. Id. § 55-12.5 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
17. Although federal law generally seeks to impose a transfer tax on all covered gen-
erational transfers, section 2631 was added to the Internal Revenue Code to give each
taxpayer a one million dollar exemption from the taxation of generation-skipping trans-
fers ("GST") in trust for the maximum period permitted by local law which, at that time,
was the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. I.R.C. § 2631 (1986). The existence of this
GST exemption stimulated (i) the development of the so-called "dynasty trust," which re-
fers to a trust whose assets theoretically can escape transfer taxation forever if there are
no limits placed upon the trust's duration by local law, and (ii) the movement to abolish
the Rule Against Perpetuities as a limiting local law factor in the creation of such trusts.
For an excellent discussion of dynasty trusts in the perpetuities context, see R. Zebulon et
al., The Rule Against Perpetuities: An Update, 24 TAx MGmT. EST., GIFTs AND TR. J. 222
(1999).
18. According to the Associated Press, "[olnly about two percent of Americans pay es-
tate taxes." GOP Gains Support for Repealing Estate Tax, RICH. TIES DISPATCH, May 19,
2000, at A12. The opt-out legislation is designed for that portion of this two percent who (i)
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der federal law that appears destined for repeal or significant re-
laxation in the reasonably near future.2" The proponents' primary
argument was that major banks in Virginia were already able to
obtain the desired tax result for their customers by using one of
their affiliates located in an "opt-out" state; thus, this legislation
was necessary to level the playing field for the small in-state
banks. The rejected counterargument was that the major banks'
out-of-state actions had no impact on Virginia law or property,
whereas the myopic opt-out proposal would adversely affect the
entirety of Virginia law and property because it would enable
everyone (not just the favored few) to tie up the title to any real or
personal property in perpetuity.21 It is submitted that the nega-
possess the extra wealth of those thought to be candidates for creating dynasty trusts, (ii)
have the inclination to tie up property in perpetuity to the detriment of their known de-
scendants for the benefit of unknown descendants in the distant future, and (iii) will use
an in-state bank as trustee of their dynasty trust.
19. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities enacted by the 2000 Session can
be used to guarantee the GST tax benefit for ninety years or longer. UNIF. STATUTORY
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES ACT 8B U.L.A. 321 (1993 & Supp. 2000); discussion supra
Part II.A.
20. "In August, 1999, both the United States House of Representatives and Senate
passed the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Bill of 1999 [that was vetoed by the President, one
provision of which was a] phased-in repeal of the estate, gift and generation-skipping
taxes." Charles D. Fox, IV, Repeal of Estate and Gift Tax: Rising Tide or High-Water
Mark?, 139 TR. & EST. 56, 56 (2000). This article, which appears in the journal of the trust
banking industry, contains an excellent analysis of all aspects of the repeal issue.
Similar legislation was passed by the House and Senate in 2000, but, again, was vetoed by
the President. Richard W. Stevenson, Veto of Estate Tax Repeal Survives Vote in the
House, N.Y. TIMES (National), Sept. 8, 2000, at A14. In response to the President's veto,
the press secretary for the Republican presidential candidate issued a statement that
Bush "would have signed it into law." Statement by Bush/Cheney Press Secretary Mindy
Tucker Regarding President Clinton's Veto of Estate Tax Relief, Aug. 31, 2000, available at
http://www.georgewbush.com/News.asp?FormMode=NR&ID=1154. Estate tax repeal is a
part of the 2000 Republican Platform. Issues, at http://www.georgewbush.comllssues.asp
(last visited Oct. 20, 2000). Although the Democratic presidential nominee is against re-
peal, he is in favor of estate tax relief and "Gore's plan would eliminate estate taxes for
more than 90 percent of family farms that currently do pay estate taxes, and more than 70
percent of small businesses that currently pay estate taxes, and provide some estate tax
relief for all small businesses and family farms." Gore 2000: Gore Offers Estate Tax Relief
for Working Families, at http://www.algore.com.. .ngroomreleases/pr_0621_natLlhtml
(last visited Oct. 20, 2000).
21. The proponents' secondary argument, that enactment of an opt-out provision was
necessary to prevent the capital flight and loss of banking business that would otherwise
be caused by Virginians going to other jurisdictions to create dynasty trusts, is clearly un-
sound when one considers the small numbers represented by the favored few. Moreover,
even if the numbers were larger, the fact that Virginians creating corporations have not
been flocking to Delaware, long recognized as the most corporate-friendly jurisdiction, to
obtain a definite present benefit for themselves, suggests that they would not likely go
elsewhere to create dynasty trusts to obtain a possible future benefit for their descendants.
The proponents' tertiary argument that the enactment of an opt-out provision would at-
1072
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
tive impact of the opt-out legislation upon Virginia law and prop-
erty is too high a price to pay for the ephemeral tax benefit being
sought for the favored few.22
Although a detailed analysis of the opt-out legislation is not
feasible within the confines of this annual review, its complete
text follows in order to provide the reader a context in which at-
tention can be focused upon several concerns:
The rule against perpetuities shall not apply to any trust or any in-
terest created in personal property held in such trust, or to any
power of appointment over personal property held in such trust, or to
any power of appointment over personal property granted under
such trust, when the trust instrument, by its terms, provides that
the rule against perpetuities shall not apply to such trust.
23
Notwithstanding the proponents' assurances that the opt-out
provision will apply only to personal property and cannot be used
to tie up the title to real estate, the reader will note that the leg-
islation's first line refers to "any trust" without imposing any
such qualification or limitation.' Moreover, even if the courts do
interpret this legislation as applying only to personal property, it
is child's play to transmute realty into personalty at wll.2 In ad-
dition, assuming the courts determine that such trusts are re-
stricted to personal property, what will happen if a trust acquires
any realty by way of gift or investment? Will the trust then be-
come wholly or partially subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities?
If so, will the Rule's application relate back to the trust's creation,
will it be prospective only, and/or will the problem be "cured" by
divesting the trust of the realty? Although other states have at-
tract trust business to the Commonwealth suffers from the same favored few logical flaw
as their secondary argument.
22. The legal literature is replete with discussions of the social and commercial evils
that accompany the power to tie up the title to property in perpetuity. For the classic pres-
entation of the Rule's development and operation, see JOHN CIinPMAN GRAY, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUrIES 126-90 (4th ed. 1942).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 2000). This text was substituted for the
bill's original language. See S.B. 502, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000). The complete
written explanation for the substitution was "fiun response to questions, amendment clari-
fies that bill does not apply to real estate. Otherwise improves the language." Explanation
of Substitute for S.B. No. 502, distributed in the Civil and Property Law Subcommittee of
the Senate Courts of Justice Committee (Feb. 3, 2000).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
25. For instance, if one wishes to place the traditional "Blackacre" in perpetual trust,
one could simply incorporate Blackacre and then place the corporate stock (personal prop-
erty) into the perpetual trust and thereby accomplish the desired result. If, for any reason,
the corporate route is not desirable, other routes are available.
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tempted to reduce the potential for a trust's settlor to tie up spe-
cific property in perpetuity by requiring that the property always
be subject to someone's power to convey, there is no such re-
quirement in the Virginia version." Further, the Virginia opt-out
legislation refers to "the" Rule, but Virginia has two Rules-the
Uniform Act that applies to all donative and some nondonative
transfers, and the Restatement rule that applies to the nondona-
tive transfers not specifically covered by the Uniform Act. One
would assume that the proponents intended the opt-out legisla-
tion to apply only to the former, and not to both, but they placed
it in the section that deals only with the latter." Lastly in this
nonexclusive list, it should be noted that the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities is simply a rule that deals with the remoteness of vesting
of an interest in property. There is a further rule, the common
law Rule Against Accumulations, that deals with the permissible
duration of trusts. Although this latter rule is rather obviously
implicated in the perpetual trusts under consideration, it is not
addressed by the opt-out legislation.2"
C. Inter Vivos Receptacle Trusts-Nonresident Trustee-
Service of Process
Whereas traditional estate planning has been will-based, a
number of today's estate planners sometimes favor a plan based
upon an inter vivos trust.29 In these inter vivos trust-based plans,
the desire to integrate all of the client's assets into one manage-
26. The Maryland opt-out provision requires that "the trustee, or other person to
whom the power is properly granted or delegated, has the power under the governing in-
strument, applicable statute, or common law to sell, lease, or mortgage [trust] prop-
erty.... " MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(e) (Cur. Supp. 1998). The Virginia
bill's original language, which appeared to be based upon the Maryland statute, did con-
tain such a provision. S.B. 502, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000). Section 55-13.3 is entitled "Applica-
tion of the rule against perpetuities to nondonative transfers." Id.
28. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-351 (Repl. Vol. 1999). The Rule Against Accumulations is
addressed in Chapter 9 of Title 6.1 of the Virginia Code, which deals with Real Estate In-
vestment Trusts and provides that "[tihe duration of a [real estate investment] trust may
be unlimited and a [real estate investment] trust shall not be deemed to violate any rule
against perpetuities or accumulations or to unlawfully suspend the power of alienation."
Id. For a recent case discussing the difference between these two separate rules, see White
v. Fleet Bank, 1999 Me. 148, 739 A-2d 373 (1999).
29. For a discussion of the real versus the illusory benefits of trust-based estate plan-
ning, see J. Rodney Johnson, The Living Trust vs. The Will: Which Is Best for the Typical
Virginian?, 42 VA. LAW., Jan. 1994, at 37.
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ment vehicle following the client's death is accomplished by
making a testamentary gift, called a "pour-over," of the client's
residuary probate estate to an inter vivos "receptacle" trust. The
1999 Session replaced Virginia's aging pour-over statute with the
more modern Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act
(1991), to which it added provisions (i) permitting any nonresi-
dent individual or entity to serve as the sole trustee of a recepta-
cle trust receiving a pour-over from a Virginia estate, and (ii)
eliminating the mandatory surety bond requirement formerly im-
posed upon such a trustee."° However, in order to retain a meas-
ure of control over receptacle trusts which have no resident co-
trustee, the 1999 legislation continued the prohibition against
any distributions to such a trust until its nonresident sole trustee
files a written consent in the appropriate clerk's office appointing
a Virginia resident as agent for the receipt of process in any trust-
related matter.3'
The possible problem not resolved by the 1999 legislation con-
cerns service of process in trust-related matters following the
death, incapacity, etc. of the Virginia resident who was appointed
to serve as agent for its receipt. This problem does not arise when
dealing with the agent of a nonresident personal representative,
testamentary trustee, or any other fiduciary who qualifies in the
clerk's office, because section 26-7.1 deems such fiduciaries to
have appointed the clerk of court as a successor agent for service
of process in these cases.32 However, this procedural remedy is
not applicable to the trustee of an inter vivos receptacle trust be-
cause there is no requirement that such a trustee "qualify" in the
clerk's office. Thus, the 2000 Session amended section 26-7.1 to
provide that a nonresident trustee of a receptacle trust who files
the required consent in the clerk's office is deemed to have also
appointed the clerk as a successor agent "whenever the resident
appointed to receive service cannot be found and served within
the Commonwealth after the exercise of due diligence."3
30. Act of Mar. 18, 1999, ch. 252, Va. Acts 267 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73.1
(Cum. Supp. 1999)). For a discussion of this legislation, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual
Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1075, 1078-79
(1999).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73.1(D) (Cure. Supp. 1999).
32. Id. § 26-7.1(A) (Cure. Supp. 2000).
33. Id. § 26-7.1(B) (Cur. Supp. 2000). This procedural remedy is also made applicable
to trustees who filed a consent under section 64.1-73, the prior pour-over statute that con-
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D. Inter Vivos Trusts-Tenancy by the Entirety-Principal
Family Residence
The form of concurrent ownership known as the tenancy by the
entirety, which can exist only between a husband and wife, is the
most popular form of real estate ownership for married couples in
Virginia. The primary reason for this popularity is the common
law immunity of such property from the claims of the individual
(but not the joint) creditors of the husband and the wife. 4 How-
ever, married couples who decided to base their estate planning
upon an inter vivos trust have been unable to obtain any benefit
from this common law immunity because realty owned by a trust
is not owned by a husband and wife, even if the husband and wife
are the trustees and the beneficiaries of the trust. Responding to
this perceived inequity, the 2000 Session broke new ground by
amending section 55-20.1 to enable a husband and wife to convey
certain tenancy by the entirety real estate to "their joint revoca-
ble or irrevocable trust, or in equal shares to their separate revo-
cable or irrevocable trusts" without losing its tenancy by the en-
tirety status.5 However, the only real estate that may be so
protected is their "principal family residence"36 that was held by
them as tenants by the entireties prior to its conveyance to the
trust, and this protection lasts only "so long as (i) they remain
husband and wife, (ii) it continues to be held in the trust or
trusts, and (iii) it continues to be their principal family resi-
dence."37
E. Inter Vivos Trusts-Transfer Costs-Funding, Revocation,
and Distribution
Among the many factors that must be taken into account in de-
tinues to govern pour-overs made under the wills of decedents who died prior to July 1,
1999. Id. § 64.1-73 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
34. This point was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in the recent case of
Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 323, 512 S.E.2d 821 (1999). The 1999 Session resolved a linger-
ing uncertainty in this area by providing that a husband and wife might also hold personal
property as tenants by the entireties. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.1 (Cune. Supp. 1999). For a
discussion of section 55-20.1, see Johnson, supra note 30, at 1081-82.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
36. Id. The term "principal family residence" was taken from section 64.1-16.4. Id.
§ 64.1-16.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
37. Id. § 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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termining whether to base an estate plan upon a will or a revoca-
ble inter vivos trust is a calculation of the transfer costs that will
be incurred when assets are (i) transferred to the trust by the set-
tlor, (ii) returned to the settlor upon partial or total termination
of the trust, or (iii) distributed to beneficiaries of the trust. Rec-
ognizing the increasing role that revocable inter vivos trusts are
playing in estate planning, and desiring to place their users on a
more equal footing with persons who use will-based plans, the
2000 Session amended a number of code sections as follows: (i)
the recordation tax imposed by section 58.1-801 upon deeds con-
veying real estate is not applicable to transfers to trust benefici-
aries following the settlor's death;" (ii) the watercraft sales and
use tax imposed by section 58.1-1402 is not applicable upon (a)
funding the trust when the grantor is among its beneficiaries, or
(b) distribution to beneficiaries following the grantor's death;39
(ifi) the aircraft sales and use tax imposed by section 58.1-1502 is
not applicable upon (a) funding the trust when the grantor is
among its beneficiaries, or (b) distribution to beneficiaries fol-
lowing the grantor's death;40 and (iv) the motor vehicle sales and
use tax imposed by section 58.1-2402 is not applicable (a) upon
funding the trust when the grantor is among its beneficiaries, (b)
distribution to beneficiaries following the grantor's death, or (c)
return to the grantor.4 Note that the broader exemption from
38. Id. § 58.1-811(A)(13) (Cun. Supp. 2000). Prior to the amendment, this non-
applicability applied only when the post-death beneficiaries were the decedents spouse, or
the kindred of the decedent or the decedenes spouse. As this portion of the 2000 amend-
ment is not restricted to revocable trusts, it is also applicable to irrevocable ones. Unlike
the transactions that follow in (ii), (iii), and (iv) in the text, funding, return, and some life-
time transfers of real estate were already exempted from transfer (recordation) taxes. Id.
§ 58.1-811(A)(12) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
39. Id. § 58.1-1404(F) (Cum. Supp. 2000). This amendment also requires for its opera-
tion that "no consideration has passed between the grantor and the beneficiaries in either
case." Id. It is difficult, however, to see consideration ever being a factor in what, by defini-
tion, is normally a donative transaction.
40. Id. § 58.1-1501(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2000). This amendment also requires for its opera-
tion that "no consideration has passed between the grantor and the beneficiaries in either
case." Id. It is, however, difficult to see consideration ever being a factor in what, by defini-
tion, is normally a donative transaction.
41. Id. § 58.1-2403(24) (Cum. Supp. 2000). This amendment also requires for its op-
eration that "no consideration has passed between the grantor and the beneficiaries in ei-
ther case." Id. It is difficult, however, to see consideration ever being a factor in what, by
definition, is normally a donative transaction. Interestingly, further "ground-leveling"
legislation that would have allowed certain motor vehicles "held in a private trust for per-
sonal use by an individual beneficiary" to be a "qualifying vehicle" for purposes of the Per-
sonal Property Tax Relief Act of 1998, see id. §§ 58.1-3523 to -3536 (Cum. Supp. 1999),
popularly known as "No Car Tax," was defeated by the Senate Finance Committee. See
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sales and use tax for motor vehicles than that for watercraft or
aircraft is due to the passage of two different bills dealing with
motor vehicles,42 and that neither (ii), (iii), nor (iv) exempts trans-
fers to the trust's third-party beneficiaries from the applicable
sales or use tax if they are made during the settlor's lifetime.
F. Wills-Capacity-Emancipated Minor
The general rule of section 64.1-47, dealing with who may not
make a will, prohibits persons "under the age of eighteen years"
from making a testamentary disposition of property.43 However,
section 16.1-334, dealing with the effects of a court order emanci-
pating a minor, specifically provides that "[tihe minor
may... execute a will."44 To "correct the conflict between the two
sections,"45 the 2000 Session amended section 64.1-47 to prohibit
the will-writing of persons "under the age of eighteen years, un-
less emancipated pursuant to Article 15 (§ 16.1-331 et seq.) of
Chapter 11 of title 16.1. " 41
G. Spousal or Parental Desertion or Abandonment-
Qualification As Administrator
Subsection A of section 64.1-16.3 provides that a married per-
son whose desertion or abandonment continues until the deserted
spouse's death is barred from receiving the statutory rights of "in-
testate succession, elective share, exempt property, family allow-
ance, and homestead allowance" in the latter's estate.47 Subsec-
tion B further provides that a parent whose desertion or
abandonment continues until the deserted child's death is barred
H.B. 591, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
42. H.B. 527, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 7, 2000, ch.
602, 2000 Va. Acts 943) (applying to watercraft, aircraft, and motor vehicles and deals
with funding the trust and post-death distributions to the beneficiaries); H.B. 360, Va.
Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 7, 2000, ch. 576, 2000 Va. Acts
1044) (applying only to motor vehicles and deals with funding the trust and the return to
the grantor).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-47 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
44. Id. § 16.1-334 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
45. Virginia General Assembly Bill Tracking 2000 Session, H.B. 394, Summary as in-
troduced, available at http://legl.state.va.us.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-47 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
47. Id. § 64.1-16.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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from receiving the statutory right of intestate succession in the
child's estate.' The 2000 Session extended these substantive
rules into the procedural area by amending section 64.1-118 to
provide that "[i]f any beneficiary of the estate objects, no [person
so barred] shall be suitable to serve as an administrator of the es-
tate of the deceased spouse or child... ."4' Section 64.1-116,
dealing with the appointment of an administrator, c.t.a., received
an identical amendment.5 0
H. Fiduciary Accounts-Permissible Depositories
The 2000 Session added credit unions to the list of financial in-
stitutions that may operate fiduciary accounts for an "administra-
tor, executor, custodian, conservator, guardian, trustee or other
fiduciary for a named beneficiary or beneficiaries."5' It also pro-
vided them with the same authorizations and protections pres-
ently enjoyed by banks5 2 and savings institutions" in the opera-
tion of these accounts.54
I. Fiduciary Accountings--Surety Bond Premiums
Section 26-17.3, which states the general rule regarding a court
or clerk-appointed fiduciary's duty to account for all receipts and
disbursements before a commissioner of accounts, is immediately
followed by other statutes that deal with the specific accounting
rules applicable to each such fiduciary.55 A further general rule,
found in section 26-17.9, requires all of these fiduciaries to pro-
vide the commissioner with vouchers supporting all disburse-
ments during the accounting period.56 But no statute requires or
authorizes a commissioner to inquire about an estate or fiduciary
obligation where there is no disbursement, and testimony before
48. Id. § 64.1-16.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
49. Id. § 64.1-118 (Cu . Supp. 2000).
50. Id. § 64.1-116 (Cu . Supp. 2000).
51_ Id. § 6.1-225.50:1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
52. Id. § 6.1-75 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
53. Id. § 6.1-194.60 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
54. Id. § 6.1-225.50:2 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (using the language of that applicable to
banks and savings institutions, mutatis mutandis).
55. Id. § 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
56. Id. § 26-17.9 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
20001 1079
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1069
the 2000 Session indicated that a problem had developed re-
garding the payment of premiums on surety bonds. Accordingly,
section 26-17.10, which deals with miscellaneous accounting mat-
ters, was amended to empower a commissioner to require "proof
that all premiums due upon any required surety bond have been
paid."57
J. Income Tax-Estates and Trusts-Estimated Payments
The 2000 Session amended section 58.1-492 to provide a new
way to annualize the income of estates and trusts to determine
whether or not they have paid the correct amount of estimated
taxes, or whether they should be assessed penalties and interest
for underpayment." The amendment seeks to accomplish its goal
by requiring estates and trusts to "annualize taxable income
through the month which is two months before the month in
which an estimated tax payment is required."59
III. CARRYOVER LEGISLATION
House Bill No. 1195, carried over to the 2001 Session, would
amend Virginia Code section 64.1-122.2, which deals with written
notice of probate and qualification being provided to certain par-
ties, to require that these parties be sent a copy of the decedent's
will.6" In addition, this bill would amend section 26-27 by chang-
ing the present rule which prohibits a commissioner of accounts
from completing a fiduciary's account until ten days after the
commissioner has posted a list of existing accounts on the front
door of the courthouse, to a rule prohibiting the commissioner
from completing a fiduciary's account until ten days after the fi-
duciary has sent notice to certain persons that the fiduciary's ac-
count is before the commissioner for settlement.61 Although there
are technical problems with the language of the bill as intro-
duced, it is difficult to overstate the importance of this proposal
57. Id. § 26-17.10(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
58. Id. § 58.1-492 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
59. S.B. 537, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 4, 2000, ch.
388, 2000 Va. Acts 585).
60. H.B. 1195, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
61. Id.
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because it addresses an aspect of Virginia probate law that is
patently unconstitutional.
6 2
IV. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Wills-Life Estate or Precatory Language-Mortgage
Liability-Jurisdiction
In Gaymon v. Gaymon,63 the first paragraph in Article 5 of T's
typed will devised his home to his children by a prior marriage,
"'subject to any encumbrances upon the same upon the date of
transfer."'" Prior to the will's execution,65 T added a holographic
interlineation to this sentence, stating "'and the mortgage re-
maining shall be paid by the remainder persons.' 66 The second
paragraph of Article 5 further provided that: "'It is understood
that in the case that [Widow] and I have residence at [home] at
the time of my demise, she would have a life estate in the same
for the remainder of her life.' 67
In a suit brought by T's executor seeking the court's aid and di-
rection in the administration of T's estate, the primary issue was
whether the language of the second paragraph (i) created a life
estate in Widow, or (ii) was merely precatory, with the children
taking an immediate fee simple estate under the first para-
graph.68 Affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the reference to "remainder persons" in the first para-
graph's holographic addendum "is consistent only with the con-
clusion that a life estate was created."69 The trial court also inter-
62. For a discussion of the issues involved and a suggested resolution, see J. Rodney
Johnson, The Absence of Due Process in Fiduciary Accounting: A Constitutional Concern,
23 VA. BARASS'N J., Fall 1997, at 11.
63. 258 Va. 225, 519 S.E.2d 142 (1999).
64. Id. at 228, 519 S.E.2d at 143.
65. This critical fact is not mentioned in the opinion but it is documented in the rec-
ord. See Record at 46-7, Gaymon (No. 982483). Although the handwritten interlineation
was initialed by T, which would satisfy Ts signature requirement, the absence of attesting
witnesses would have rendered the interlineation wholly ineffective because it was not
sufficient, standing alone, to qualify as a holographic codicil. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49
(Repl. Vol. 1995); Triplett v. Triplett, 161 Va. 906, 172 S.E. 162 (1934).
66. Gaymon, 258 Va. at 228, 519 S.E.2d at 143.
67. Id. 519 S.E.2d at 144.
68. Id. at 230-31, 519 S.E.2d at 145.
69. Id. at 231, 519 S.E.2d at 145 (1999) (distinguishing Carson v. Simmons, 198 Va.
854, 856, 96 S.E.2d 800, 804 (1957), where the substantially similar language, i.e., "with
2000]
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preted the holographic interlineation as expressing T's intent
that all principal and interest expense on the home's mortgage be
paid by the remainder persons. 0 The supreme court, while
agreeing on the principal issue,7' did not agree "that by using the
word 'mortgage,' the testator intended to deviate from the well-
established common law principle" imposing the interest liability
upon the life tenant. 2 Notwithstanding its conclusion that T's
will imposed liability for payment of the mortgage principal upon
the remainder persons if they accepted the devise,7" the supreme
court reversed that portion of the trial court's decision subjecting
the devised property to a lien for the principal payments made by
Widow because "the remainder persons are not parties to this ac-
tion."74 Query: If the remainder persons were not parties to the
action, how could the supreme court determine that they took
only a remainder, and not a fee simple, under T's will?75
B. Will Construction- "Personal Property" -Ejusdem Generis
In Turner v. Reed,76 T's will left to two friends "'my resi-
dence.., and all of the furniture and personal property located in
and about said residence, along with any automobile which I may
the understanding," was held to be precatory in one paragraph of a will and mandatory in
another).
70. Id. at 232, 519 S.E.2d at 146.
71. The supreme court further noted that, although the common law doctrine of exon-
eration would ordinarily make T's personal estate the primary fund for payment of mort-
gage principal, the "subject to any encumbrances" language of the first paragraph would
have shifted this liability to the encumbered property-but for the holographic interlinea-
tion which shifted it to the remainder persons. Id. at 233, 519 S.E.2d at 146-47.
72. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 146.
73. The acceptance issue was not before the supreme court, and thus not decided. Id.
at 234, 519 S.E.2d at 147.
74. Id.
75. In a previous decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated the following:
It is necessary for the validity of its judgment that a court must have juris-
diction over the subject matter and over the necessary parties. It has no ju-
risdiction to act outside the limits of the law or mode of procedure, or beyond
the issues in the pleadings. No judicial proceeding can deprive a man of his
property without giving him an opportunity to be heard in accordance with
the provisions of the law, and if a judgment is rendered against him without
such opportunity to be heard, it is absolutely void. A void judgement is in le-
gal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested and from it no rights are
obtained. All claims flowing out of it are void. It may be attacked in any pro-
ceeding by any person whose rights are affected.
Harris v. Deal, 189 Va. 675, 686-87, 54 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1949).
76. 258 Va. 406, 518 S.E.2d 832 (1999).
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own at the time of my death.'"7 T's executor (who also drafted
T's will) sought a construction of T's will to determine whether
approximately 135,000 dollars worth of stock and travelers
checks located at T's residence upon her death passed to the
friends under the emphasized words of this gift. 8 Affirming the
trial court's negative answer, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
firmed the general rule that "'[slince the term 'personal property'
is a technical term, the testatrix is generally presumed to have
used that term in its technical sense.'7 9 However, the court went
on to hold that, under the facts of this case, T's intent "was to
limit her bequest to tangible personal property."0 The court also
agreed with the trial court's application of the doctrine of ejusdem
generis in reaching its conclusion."'
C. Trusts-Creation
A primary issue in Rivera v. Nedrick,82 where the only evidence
of a possible trust was S's execution of a $10,000 promissory note
77. Id. at 408, 518 S.E.2d at 833 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 409, 518 S.E.2d at 834 (quoting Bowles v. Kinsey, 246 Va. 298, 301, 435
S.E.2d 129, 130 (1993)).
80. Id. at 410, 518 S.E.2d at 834. The court stated:
In Bowles, the word "all" defined the entire corpus of the testatrix's personal
property, unqualified by kind or situs. Here, that adjective defines only a se-
lect portion of the testatrix's personal property, that is, "furniture and per-
sonal property" and only such property as was "located in and about [her]
residence."
Id. at 409, 518 S.E.2d at 834.
81. Id. at 410, 518 S.E.2d at 834.
As we define that doctrine, in the construction of legal instruments, when the
listing of an item with a specific meaning is followed by a word of general im-
port, the general word will not be construed to include things in its widest
scope but only those things of the same import as that of the specific item
listed.
Here, the specific items listed are "furniture" and "automobile;" the general
term listed is "personal property." The widest scope of that term includes in-
tangible as well as tangible personal property. But under the doctrine in is-
sue, the general term applies only to things of the same import as that of the
specific items listed, i.e., tangible personal property.
Id. (citations omitted).
82. 259 Va. 1, 529 S.E.2d 310 (1999). Further issues dealing with suits brought on be-
half of minors by next friends, and the tolling of the statutes of limitations in such cases,
are covered in this Survey's article focusing on legal rights of children. See Robert E.
Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving Children, 34 U.
RICH. L. REV. 939 (2000).
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813payable to T, Trustee for two minor children, was whether a
trust did in fact exist.84 Reaffirming the general rule that the
presence or absence of the technical term "trustee" is not control-
ling, the court noted the absence of any stated trust purpose,
trust terms, or trust powers, and concluded that no trust had
been created in this case.8"
D. P.O.D. Accounts-Change of Beneficiaries
In Jampol v. Farmer,86 D named certain persons as P.O.D.
payees 7 on four certificates of deposit ("CDs") at the time of ac-
quisition, but no such designation appeared on replacement CDs
that were issued on two occasions during the following year when
D lost or misplaced the originals and the first replacements." Al-
though D executed certain affidavits in connection with these re-
placements, "the record contains no document signed by D di-
recting the bank to remove the P.O.D. beneficiaries from the
certificates." 9 Thus the P.O.D. payees claimed ownership of the
replacement CDs based upon Virginia Code section 6.1-125.6,
which states that ownership rights "are determined by the form
of the account at the death of a party," and that this "[florm may
be altered by written order given by a party... [that] must be
signed by a party."9" However, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that because section 6.1-125.6 states that the form of an ac-
count "may," instead of "must," be altered by a writing, the stat-
ute does not prevent a financial institution from making such a
change based upon a CD owner's in-person oral request.91 Thus,
as "the record is devoid of evidence that [D] intended to leave the
83. Rivera, 259 Va. at 3, 529 S.E.2d at 310.
84. Id. at 5-6, 529 S.E.2d at 312.
85. Id. "[W]e find no evidence of either 'explicit language' creating a trust or 'circum-
stances which show with reasonable certainty that a trust was intended to be created.'" Id.
(quoting Woods v. Stull, 182 Va. 888, 902, 30 S.E.2d. 675, 682 (1944)).
86. 259 Va. 53,524 S.E.2d 436 (2000).
87. A "P.O.D. payee" is "a person designated on a P.O.D. account as one to whom the
account is payable on request after the death of one or more persons." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6.1-125.1(11) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
88. Jampol, 259 Va. at 56, 524 S.E.2d at 438. Although the replacement CDs had dif-
ferent serial numbers, they "showed the same amount, the same account number, the
same issue date, the same maturity date, and the same rate of interest as the originals."
Id.
89. Id. at 57, 524 S.E.2d at 438.
90. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.6 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
91. Jampol, 259 Va. at 58, 524 S.E.2d at 439.
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certificates unchanged, and the burden to prove this fact was
upon those who challenged the form of the accounts as they ex-
isted at her death," D's estate prevailed against the P.O.D. pay-
ees.
92
The pivotal statute in this case, Virginia Code section 6.1-
125.6, was enacted in 1979 as a part of Virginia's adoption of the
pre-1989 Uniform Probate Code's provisions governing multiple
party accounts in financial institutions.93 Although this same
statute, pre-1989 U.P.C. § 6-105,9' has been adopted in a number
of other jurisdictions, the issue in Jampol appears to have
reached the appellate level in only one other case, Wolfinger v.
Wolfinger,95 wherein the Court of Appeals of Utah reached the
opposite conclusion. 96 The Wolfinger decision is not mentioned in
Jampol.
E. Trusts-Recovery of Trustee's Attorney Fees and Expenses
In Stepp v. Foster," the Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed,
as an exception to the general American rule requiring litigants
to pay their own attorney fees, that "'[w]here a trustee has a good
faith basis for defending a suit challenging his actions as trustee,
attorney's fees and [expenses] incurred in the defense of the suit
should be charged against the trust.'"" However, that portion of
the trial court's opinion that placed this liability upon the oppos-
ing parties "because 'there is no trust fund within the control of
the court but, rather, the trust is non-liquid realty" was re-
versed.9 9 The court reasoned that although the trust's corpus was
92. Id. at 59, 524 S.E.2d at 439.
93. Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 407, 1979 Va. Acts 597 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 6.1-125.1 to 125.16 (Repl. Vol. 1999)). For a discussion of the background of this legisla-
tive reform, see J. Rodney Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust, and P.O.D. Bank Accounts; Vir-
ginia Law Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 41 (1973).
94. UNriF. PROBATE CODE § 6-105 (amended 1989); 8-11 U.L.A 474 (1998).
95. 793 P.2d 393 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This is the only case listed under pre-1989
U.P.C. § 6-105 in Uniform Laws Annotated (West) through the 1999 Supplement.
96. See id. at 396. "Under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, a joint or a P.O.D. account
can only be modified by a written request to the bank from a party to the account." Id.
(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-6-105 (1978)). The operative language of the Utah statute is
identical to pre-1989 U.P.C. § 6-105 and to VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.6 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
97. 259 Va. 210, 524 S.E.2d 866(2000).
98. Id. at 217, 524 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting Ward v. NationsBank, 256 Va. 427, 441, 507
S.E.2d 616, 624 (1998)).
99. Id. at 215, 524 S.E.2d at 869.
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real estate (common ground of a subdivision) this fact "does not
remove those assets from the control of the chancellor. Nor is it
controlling that an award of attorney fees and expenses... might
result in diminution of the corpus and thereby frustrate the gran-
tor's intention." °0 Lastly, to prevent any misinterpretation of its
holding, the supreme court emphasized the difference between
awarding a prevailing party "costs," as contemplated by section
17.1-601,"' and "expenses," which it defined as "any reasonable
expense of the trustees beyond and above their attorney's fees,
that they may have incurred as a result of being required to de-
fend this suit."0 2
F. Deed to Trust-No Reservation in Favor of Stranger
In Shirley v. Shirley, °3 S's deed conveying certain real estate to
trustees also provided that "[S] reserves unto herself a life estate
for herself and a life estate for the benefit of [D] in and to said
real property."0 4 On these facts, the Supreme Court of Virginia
agreed with the trial court that D took no interest under the deed,
holding that a common law rule that prohibits a grantor from "re-
serving" an interest in realty for the benefit of one not a party to
a deed is a part of Virginia's received common law pursuant to
Virginia Code section 1-10.105 Notwithstanding the apparent ab-
solute language of section 1-10, the supreme court has abolished
or modified the received common law in some cases,' but it de-
100. Id. at 217-18, 524 S.E.2d at 871.
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-601 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
102. Stepp, 259 Va. at 219, 524 S.E.2d at 871.
103. 259 Va. 513, 525 S.E.2d 274 (2000).
104. Id. at 515, 525 S.E.2d at 275.
105. Id. at 518, 525 S.E.2d at 276-77. Section 1-10 of the Virginia Code provides that
"tihe common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of
Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth shall continue in full force within the
same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly." VA. CODE
ANN. § 1-10 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
106. The principle followed by the supreme court when departing from the apparent
mandate of section 1-10 is that:
"[sluch of [English common law] doctrines and principles as are repugnant to
the nature and character of our political system, or which the different and
varied circumstances of our country render inapplicable to us, are either not
in force here, or must be so modified in their application as to adapt them to
our condition."
Shirley, 259 Va. at 518-19, 525 S.E.2d at 277 (quoting Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va.
306, 310, 31 S.E. 503, 505 (1898)).
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clined to do so in response to D's three-part argument in this
case.1 7 The court reasoned "that 'a decision whether to abrogate
such a fundamental rule as the one under consideration is the
function of the legislative, not judicial, branch of government. " 10 8
The court went on to state that "[t]his is particularly so when, as
here, any change in the common law rule would affect not only
inchoate but also vested property rights."0 9 It is difficult to un-
derstand the court's characterization of the stranger doctrine as a
"fundamental rule" when its opinion lists three ways that S could
have avoided this technical trap and effectively transferred a life
estate to D. This suggests that more of an emphasis is being
placed upon the form of the transaction than its substance. While
such was characteristic of the common law, it is not a common
law attribute worthy of preservation in this case."0
107. Id. at 519 525 S.E.2d at 277. D's argument was based upon the modem trend of
giving effect to a grantor's intent, the rejection of the stranger rule in numerous jurisdic-
tions, and VA. CODE ANN. § 55-22 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (Virginia's third party beneficiary stat-
ute). Shirley, 259 Va. at 516-17, 525 S.E.2d at 275-76. The latter argument was not ad-
dressed by the supreme court because it was not raised in the trial court. Id. at 520 n.9,
525 S.E.2d at 277 n.9.
108. Shirley, 259 Va. at 519, 525 S.E.2d at 277 (quoting Williamson v. The Old Brother
Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 354, 350 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1986)).
109. Id. In response to a somewhat similar statement made by the New York Court of
Appeals, one national authority commented as follows:
That rationale suggests that there is reliance on the stranger rule by drafting
attorneys and parties, an assumption which seems dubious, if not unbeliev-
able. The common law rule serves only as a penalty for faulty lawyering at
the drafting stage, with the parties paying the price. Unless some evidence
from those states rejecting the stranger rule is forthcoming which shows that
the abolition of the stranger rule creates title problems, there is no compel-
ling policy reason for courts to adhere to the stranger rule.
9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND THOMAS EDITION § 82.09(c)(2) (David A. Thomas
ed., 1999). This is the same national authority quoted by the supreme court in this case for
the purpose of naming the rule in question. Shirley, 259 Va. at 517 n.4, 525 S.E.2d at 276
n.4.
110. There are two further considerations that, if argued before the supreme court,
might have led it to a different conclusion in this case. First, it is not clear that the "no
reservation in a stranger" rule would have been applicable to a life estate at common law.
According to a source cited by the supreme court for another purpose,
[s]trictly the term "reservation," implies a right of the nature of rent reserved
to a landlord or lord of a manor; thus rent, heriots, suit of mill, and suit of
court are reservations, and have been described as the only things, which, ac-
cording to the legal meaning of the word, are reservations.... The term is
frequently used, however, to denote some incorporeal right over a thing
granted of which the grantor intends to have the benefit, such as a fishing
right or sporting right or a right of way. In this case the reservation formerly
operated as a regrant of the right of the grantee to the grantor, and it was not
effectual unless the deed in which it was contained was executed by the
grantee.
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G. Personal Representatives-Appointment--Jurisdiction
In Bolling v. D'Amato,"' two years after D's widow was ap-
pointed administrator of D's estate, the court appointed D's son
"co-administrator... for the exclusive purpose of bringing legal
action on behalf of the estate."" 2 Applying "an ancient and settled
rule," the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the son's appoint-
ment as co-administrator was "void because, at the time the order
was entered, the decedent already had a properly qualified ad-
ministrator in Virginia. "1 3 However, notwithstanding the "set-
tled" nature of this rule, the court specifically stated that its deci-
sion was "limited to the present case and shall operate
prospectively only.""'
H. Wills-Construction-Conversion of Debt to Advancement
Applying settled principles of Virginia law to the unique facts
presented in O'Brien v. O'Brien,"5 the Supreme Court of Virginia
concluded that (i) T's will converted a son's debt into an ad-
vancement,'16 (ii) T's executors were entitled to recover from T's
Deeds and Other Instruments, 13 Halsbury's Laws of Eng. (Butterworths) % 238 (2000).
Second, the literature suggests that the stranger rule came into existence in a legal envi-
ronment where conveyancing was regularly accomplished by deed indented (executed by
grantor and grantee), in which case any third party mentioned therein would necessarily
be a stranger thereto. However, in today's typical conveyance by deed poll (executed only
by the grantor), one in the position of the intended life tenant in the present case would be
no more a "stranger" to the deed than the grantee of the remainder interest. For a discus-
sion of deeds indented and poll, their effect on persons not parties thereto, and the origin
of Virginia Code section 55-22, see 2 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 1026-27 (Frederick
Deane Goodwin Ribble ed., 2d ed. 1928).
111. 259 Va. 299, 526 S.E.2d 257 (2000).
112. Id. at 301, 526 S.E.2d at 258. The legal action in question was an action under
Virginia's Death by Wrongful Act statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 to -56 (Repl. Vol.
1995).
113. Bolling, 259 Va. at 304, 526 S.E.2d at 259.
114. Id. The court's further statement that "this decision will not affect the validity of
any orders entered in the past under circumstances similar to those underlying the order
in issue here" suggests that the practice followed in this case might have occurred with
some frequency in the past. Id.
115. 259 Va. 552, 526 S.E.2d 1 (2000).
116. The term "advancement" was used in a secondary sense. The legal concept of "ad-
vancements" relates to property passing by intestate succession. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-17 (Repl. Vol. 1995). The significance of this holding lies in the fact that the excess
of a debt over an heir's share can be recovered from the heir by the decedenfs estate, but
the excess of an advancement over an heir's share cannot. McCoy v. McCoy, 105 Va. 829,
54 S.E. 995 (1906).
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estate their attorney's fees incurred in unsuccessfully seeking to
collect the son's "debt," and (iii) the son was not entitled to re-
cover from T's estate his attorney's fees incurred in successfully
defending against the executors' claim."7
I. Wills-Torts-Intentional Interference with Inheritance
The Supreme Court of Virginia again applied settled principles
of Virginia law to the facts in Economopoulos v. Kolaitis"8 and
held that, although the trial court erred in finding a confidential
relationship between the decedent and his son, it correctly struck
the plaintiffs' claims in constructive fraud, conversion, and unjust
enrichment."' The troubling part of this decision is that the su-
preme court "agree[d] with the trial court that a cause of action
for 'tortious interference with inheritance' is not recognized in
Virginia.""0 The black-letter rule of this doctrine reads: "One who
by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents
another from receiving from a third party an inheritance or gift
that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the
other for loss of the inheritance or gift.""'2
Although facts justifying the application of this rule do not ex-
ist in the present case, one hopes that if the doctrine's requisites
are found in a future case, the court will not hesitate to extend
recognition to this remedy.
V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OPINION
A. Will Contracts-Dead Man's Statute-Interested Party
In Stephens v. Caruthers,22 the plaintiffs sought enforcement
of an alleged oral contract to make a will.'23 The strongest evi-
117. O'Brien, 259 Va at 558, 526 S.E.2d at 9.
118. 259 Va. 806, 528 S.E.2d 714 (2000).
119. Id. at 815, 528 S.E.2d at 720.
120. Id.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979). For a helpful discussion of this
doctrine see Nita Leford, Intentional Interference with Inheritance, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 325 (1995).
122. 97 F. Supp. 2d 698 (E.D. Va. 2000).
123. Id. at 700.
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dence of the alleged agreement was the testimony of a plaintiff
("P") and P's spouse ("S") regarding statements made in their
presence by the parties to the alleged will contract. 2 4 As the Vir-
ginia Dead Man's Statue provides in part that "no judgment or
decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse or interested party
founded on his uncorroborated testimony,"'25 S's testimony was
offered to corroborate P's testimony. Although S was not a plain-
tiff, P "admitted in her deposition testimony that [S] will share in
her inheritance should she prevail in this litigation."'26 The Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia recognized that
"[w]hether the spousal relationship by itself renders [SI 'inter-
ested' is doubtful, both on principle and because authority from
Virginia and elsewhere point persuasively to this result."'27 The
court went on to hold, however, that "[wlhere, as here, the party
to the record declares that her spouse will share in the inheri-
tance, should the will contest succeed, the spouse is an 'interested
party' whose testimony may not serve as corroborating evidence
under the Dead Man's Statute."28
In addition to any technical objections that may be raised by
evidence scholars, it appears that the court's "interested party"
conclusion conflicts with its expressed doubt regarding whether
the spousal relationship, standing alone, makes S an interested
party. It is believed that any but the most unusual married per-
son would anticipate that his spouse would to some extent share
any inheritance received, and that such anticipation would likely
have the same tendency to influence that person's testimony as
did P's .unenforceable statement of intention in the present case.
This belief is reinforced by the Supreme Court of Virginia's 1887
holding that a gift to a married man necessarily inures to the
benefit of his wife. 129 Moreover, from a public policy standpoint, is
it desirable to develop a protocol that will require counsel in every
such case, where one spouse's testimony is offered to corroborate
the other's, to ask the latter if he anticipates sharing any recov-
124. Id.
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
126. Stephens, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
127. Id. at 706-07.
128. Id. at 707. After examining the remaining evidence, the court entered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that "no reasonable factfinder" could conclude
that it was sufficient to corroborate the "adverse' testimony of P and the "interested" tes-
timony of S regarding the alleged will contract. Id. at 711.
129. McDearman v. Hodnett, 83 Va. 281, 283, 2 S.E. 643, 644(1887).
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ery with the corroborating spouse? 3 ' The pressure to give a nega-
tive answer in such a case, and the cross examination that a
negative answer will engender, argue against such a protocol.
VI. VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS
A. Legal Malpractice-Will Beneficiary-Cause of Action Stated
In Timmons v. J.D.,'' T retained an attorney ("D") to draft a
will leaving T's entire estate to two persons, one of whom prede-
ceased T, thereby making plaintiff the sole beneficiary under T's
will."' However, D, who retained T's will in his possession fol-
lowing its execution, did not notify plaintiff or any of T's heirs of
its existence following T's death. 3 ' As a result, T's estate was
distributed to T's heirs under the laws of intestate succession. 34
The plaintiff, one of the intestate takers, brought an action to re-
cover from D the difference between what she received as an heir
and what she was entitled to receive under T's will.135 The plain-
tiffs action was based upon the theory that
an implied contract arose between [T] and [D] that [D] would exer-
cise reasonable care in safeguarding the will, that [D] would deliver
the will to a proper third party in the event of [T]'s death, and that
[D] would deliver the will to Plaintiff (who was also the administra-
tor of the estate) at [Ti's death.1 36
The plaintiff claimed that she was an intended third party
beneficiary of this contract. 3  D's demurrer, which was based
upon the Supreme Court of Virginia's lamentable decision in Co-
penhaver v. Rogers,38 was overruled by the trial judge who held D
130. Or, by logical extension, to ask a widowed mother if she plans to leave any portion
of her recovery to her children at death.
131. 49 Va. Cir. 201 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Charlottesville City).
132. Id. at 201.
133. Id. at 202.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 201. The theory of this case suggests an additional liability exposure for
drafting attorneys who serve as custodians of their clients' wills. For a discussion of these
issues, see J. Rodney Johnson, The Danger of Retaining a Will: A Virginia View, 6 VA. BAR
AsS'N J., Spring 1980, at 4.
137. Timmons, 49 Va. Cir. at 203.
138. 238 Va. 361, 384 S.E.2d 593 (1989). For an excellent critique of this case, see
Brian Adams, Note, Whose Beneficiaries Are They Anyway? Copenhaver v. Rogers and the
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to be "incorrect in reading Copenhaver as establishing a per se
bar to malpractice claims brought by the beneficiaries of a will
against the drafter."'39 Instead, the trial judge found the Copen-
haver rule to require that "the Plaintiff must allege that the de-
cedent clearly and directly intended to benefit the beneficiaries
when she entered the contract for legal services with her attor-
ney."4 ° In this context, the trial court's review of the plaintiffs
pleadings led it to the conclusion that "Plaintiff has adequately
alleged facts sufficient to draw the inference that the decedent's
overriding purpose in contracting with Defendant was to benefit
the Plaintiff."'
B. Trusts-Prudent Investor Rule-Trustee's Personal Liability
In In re Will of Somma," the issue before the Richmond Cir-
cuit Court was "whether a trustee has violated his fiduciary duty
by subjecting trust funds to investment practices known as 'day
trading,' 'calls,' and 'margins.""' Under the facts of this case, the
court answered this question in the affirmative, and held the
trustee personally liable for $77,418.75 incurred in one year for
brokerage commissions and the margin interest on the transac-
tions in question.'" The court's opinion also contains an excellent
primer on these investment practices in the context of Virginia's
relatively new Prudent Investor Rule. 45
VII. VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION
The 1990 Session of the General Assembly enacted the Uniform
Custodial Trust Act,146 which "is designed to provide a statutory
Attorney's Contract to Prepare a Will in Virginia, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 415 (1990).
139. Timmons, 49 Va. Cir. at 203.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 204.
142. 49 Va. Cir. 213 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Richmond City).
143. Id. at 213.
144. Id. at 220.
145. Id. at 218-20. Virginia replaced the historic Prudent Man Rule with its version of
a Prudent Investor Rule in 1992, and replaced the latter with the substantially identical
Uniform Prudent Investor Act in 1999, effective January 1, 2000. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.3
(Cum. Supp. 2000). For a discussion of this development, see Johnson, supra note 30 at
1075-76.
146. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-34.1 to .19 (Repl. Vol. 1995). For a discussion of the Act, see
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standby inter vivos trust for individuals who typically are not
very affluent or sophisticated."'47 Section 55-34.5 of the Act is a
facility of payment clause that allows third parties owing money
to, or having property of, a functionally incapacitated person to
transfer the same to an adult member of the incapacitated per-
son's family or to a trust company as custodial trustee under the
Act and receive an effective discharge; but transfers in excess of
$10,000 are not effective without court approval."8 Section
64.1-57(l)(p)(5), one of the "boiler-plate" administrative powers
that can be incorporated by reference into a will or trust, author-
izes a fiduciary to distribute a functionally incapacitated person's
entitlement "to an adult person or bank authorized to exercise
trust powers as custodial trustee for a beneficiary who is inca-
pacitated as defined in § 55-34.1,149 under the Uniform Custodial
Trust Act 5 ' to be held as custodial trustee under the terms of
such act."' 5 '1 The question presented to the Attorney General was
whether Virginia Code section 55-34.5 "require[s] a fiduciary ex-
ercising administrative powers under § 64.1-57(l)(p)(5) to obtain
court approval before distributing to a custodial trustee under the
Virginia Uniform Custodial Trust Act (the "Act") an amount ex-
ceeding $10,000. " '52 The Attorney General responded in the nega-
tive in a well reasoned opinion that concludes by noting that
while section 55-34.5 is a general provision, section
64.1-57(l)(p)(5) is a specific provision, and that the specific con-
trols the general.15
3
J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 24 U.
RICH. L. REv. 827, 829-30 (1990).
147. UNIF. CUSTODIAL TRUST ACT (Commissioners' Prefatory Note), 7A U.L.A. Part I
240(1999).
148. VA. CODEANN. § 55-34.5 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
149. This reference was added in 1999 to clarify that functional incapacity under the
Act's definition is the required criterion, as opposed to a judicial determination pursuant
to the provisions of sections 37.1-134.6 through 37.1-134.22 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-134.6
to .22 (Cum. Supp. 2000). For a discussion of this development, see Johnson, supra note 30
at 1085-86.
150. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-34.1 to .19 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cune. Supp. 2000).
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(l)(p)(5) (Cur. Supp. 2000).
152. Fiduciaries: Court Approval Not Required to Disburse More Than $10,000 to a
Custodial Trustee, THE L. DIG., May 2000, at 4.
153. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons recited herein, it is respectfully submitted that
the 2001 Session should (1) repeal the ill-considered perpetuities'
opt-out provision enacted by the 2000 Session,"' (2) extend and
enact the notice in probate legislation that was carried over from
the 2000 Session,'55 and (3) appropriately amend the Dead Man's
Statute. 15
6
154. See supra Part II.B.
155. See supra Part III.
156. See supra Part V.
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